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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSt
LEONARD B LERMAN *
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 1985-86 term was a pathbreaking one in terms
of employment relations decisions. The Court issued highly significant decisions in cases
involving affirmative action,' sexual harassment,2 religious accommodations and the
ability of state and local governments to regulate labor relations.' Of all the noteworthy
labor cases decided by the Supreme Court in its most. recent term, however, the most
significant may well be International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America v. Brock (UAW v. Brock), 5 in which the Court addressed
international trade and competition issues.
In UAW v, Brock, decided June 25, 1986, the UAW challenged the Secretary of
Labor's interpretation of eligibility requirements for participation in the Labor Depart-
ment's trade adjustment assistance program established pursuant to the Trade Act of
1974 (the Act). 6 Under this program, workers whose employment is adversely affected 7
by competition from foreign imports are entitled to a wide range of benefits." In a five
to four decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the UAW had standing to
challenge the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the eligibility provisions of the Act.'
Most importantly, UAW v. Brock addressed directly the problem of foreign compe-
tition, an issue of foremost-significance to the future of American employment relations.
The United States is no longer an insular economy, but rather an economy which must
adjust to foreign products entering its markets and, indeed, to foreign companies doing
business on its shores.") The impact of foreign competition upon American employment
relations has, and will continue to be, enormous.
A second interesting and important facet of UAW v. Brock is that it united a wide
range of groups frequently at odds with each other in support of the UAW's position
Copyright © 1987 Boston College Law School,
* B.S., Cornell University, J.D., University of Pennsylvania, M.A. (in economics), University of
California, Los Angeles. Assistant Professor of Management, Public Policy/Law and Economics
Group, Texas A & M University (currently on leave for government service),
' See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Local
Number 93, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Wygant v, Jackson Bd.
of Ethic., 106S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
2 See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
See Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
4 See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 1395 (1986).
5 106 S. Ct. 2523 (1986).
See 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1982).
See id, § '2272 (setting forth the determining standards),
8
 These benefits can include, in addition to unemployment compensation, money for job
training, job search, and job relocation. See IDEF'T OF LABOR, FACT Stut:ET No. 86-12, TRADE AD-
JUSTMENT ASSISTANCE MR WORKERS (1986).
9 UAW v. Brock, 106 S. Ct. at 2533.
10
 See generally M. WEIDENBAUM, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND THE. Punic 277-311 (1986).
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that it had legal standing to challenge the Secretary of Labor's Trade Act interpretation.
Indeed, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, AFL-CIO, the NAACP, Na-
tional. Association of Manufacturers, Alliance for Justice, and Chemical Manufacturers
Association all joined to file an amicus brief in support of the UAW's position." The
importance of this consensus is clear. Cooperation among labor, management, and other
groups is vital in effectively addressing the challenges which foreign competition poses
to American industry and labor. It is promising to see groups of ostensibly varied
interests, historically adversarial to each other, coalesce on the issue of standing.
The Court's decision in UAW v. Broth and other labor relations developments during
the 1985-86 term are important because they focus upon issues relating to international
trade and competition. These developments signal that the courts are paying greater
attention toward the impact of international business arrangements upon American
employment relations. Additionally, these developments appear to indicate an increased
cooperative spirit between labor and management, a cooperation vital in addressing the
challenges foreign trade poses to American labor.
This survey addresses some of the broad issues involving the impact of foreign
competition on American employment relations, with special emphasis on developments
during the 1985-86 Survey year. Part I presents a brief description of some of the
economic forces at work in the modern international economy. Part Ii discusses the
promise of, and challenges to, the pathbreaking General Motors-United Autoworkers
Saturn Labor Agreement which represents a positive labor-management alliance
prompted, in part, by increased foreign automaker competition. The article then pres-
ents in section III a brief survey of the Court's interpretations of section 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits undue management-union cooperation.
Next, part IV discusses the recommendations and conclusions of the Schlossberg Report
regarding the necessity of increased cooperation between labor and management. Finally,
the article discusses recent decisions applying United States civil rights laws to foreign
companies operating in America, a subject of considerable scholarly and judicial debate.
I. SOME ELEMENTARY ECONOMICS
Today we live in A'"world economy." Increased technology has lowered what econ-
omists call "transaction costs," 12 or the costs of completing transactions, to the point
where business interactions are feasible between the United States and virtually all parts
of the world. Individuals can pick up the telephone and call Japan or France without
operator assistance. Goods can easily be shipped between nations. For approximately
$800 apiece, Japanese automakers can ship cars to the United States."
Coincidental with these declining transaction costs, increasing numbers of countries
have developed and are currently developing the productive capacity to manufacture
goods for which there is a demand in the United States. Often foreign producers can
staff their facilities with workers whose compensation is but a fraction of the comparative
" See Amicus Brief of Chamber of Commerce et al., UAW v. Broth, 106 S. Ct. 2523 (1986).
12 Professor Ronald Coase wrote the classic article in this area in 1960. See Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & ECON. 1 (1960).
13 See Reynolds, Unions and Jobs: The U.S. Auto Industry, 7 J. LAB. RES. 103, 116 (1986). This
figure, of course, is somewhat higher for cars going to the East Coast and lower for cars going to
the West Coast, which may help to explain why more Japanese imports are sold on the West Coast.
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cost of the payroll of competing American producers. For example, newly industrialized
countries such as Korea and Taiwan recently have become major highly cost-efficient
producers of steel.'" Indeed, Korea has perhaps the most modern steel producing
facilities in the world and pays its production workers only about $2.00 per hour. 15
These factors have put enormous competitive pressures on a number of U.S. in-
dustries. For years, various U.S. industries, such as automobiles and steel, faced relatively
little foreign competition.' 0 At the same time, U.S. production was concentrated in a
handful of companies.I 7 As a result, these industries functioned on almost a cartel-like
basis, with companies reaping significant profits and workers earning arguably above-
market salaries.I 8
In some industries, such cartel-like behavior may be able to continue. For example,
in the cigarette industry, an industry also marked by heavy concentration,'” foreign
produced products have not been able, it seems, to meet American tastes. Consequently,
these foreign imports have not become meaningful economic "substitutes" for American-
produced goods." In the end, these firms are able to earn solid profits, and cigarette
industry production workers are able to earn average annual salaries of approximately
$41,000, salaries which one economist has estimated to be almost $20,000 a year higher
than the "market" rate of pay for production workers with comparable skill mixes. 2 '
Other industries, such as those of automobiles, rubber, textiles, and steel, have not been
so fortunate. In particular, foreign imports in these industries have often been extremely
acceptable to American tastes (and finances).
In response to this new highly competitive environment, the leading American
automakers, for one, have taken several measures. General Motors and the other auto
companies, together with the UAW, have sought protectionist legislation seeking to limit
the number of Japanese automobile imports, which by 1981 represented nearly 22
percent of all U.S. auto sales. 22 The pressure for such legislation led the Japanese in
1981 to impose a "voluntary" limit on automobile exports to the United States. 2' The
UAW and auto part suppliers also have been advocating "domestic content legislation"
which would require automakers selling large numbers of cars in the United States to
" See Shilling, Steel Industry Must Scrap Cartel Mentality, Wall St. J., July 29,1986, at 24, col.3.
Id.
le' See generally R. CRANDALL, THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY IN RECURRENT CRISIS: POLICY OPTIONS
IN A CommrrrivE WORLD (1981); FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON 'FILE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRIES
AND l'rs INTERNATIONAL RIVALS: TRENDS AND FACTORS DETERMINING INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE-
NESS (1977); THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE AUTO INDUSTRIES IN TRANSITION (R, Cole & T. Yakushiji
ed. 1984); B. YATES, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1985),
' 7 See generally A. COCKERILL, THE STEEL. INDUSTRY 56-60 (1974); W. HOGAN, STEEL IN 'rum
UNITED SrivrEs: RESTRUCTURING TO COMPETE (1984); H, KATz, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION IN
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: 1920.1940 (1970); L. WHITE, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945
(1971).
" See Reynolds, supra note 13 at 112-17; Shilling, supra note 14, at 24, col. 3.
I" See Overton, Diversification and International Expansion: The Future of the American Tobacco
Manufacturing Industry in W. FINGER, TILE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 15,161 (chart) (1981).
See generally P. JOHNSON, THE ECONOMICS OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY (1984); R. MILES, COFFIN
NAILS AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES (1982).
,() See generally A, ALCIIIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINA-
TION & CONTROL 173-78 (1983).
2 ' See Shilling, supra note 14, at 24, col. 3.
22 See M. WEIDENIIAUM, supra note 10, at 279.
23 Id.
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have up to ninety percent domestic parts and labor in their cars." In response to these
and other protectionist pressures, various Japanese auto companies have begun U.S.
operations. Nissan, for example, has opened a major plant in Smyrna, Tennessee, and
Toyota has entered into a joint venture with General Motors to manufacture cars in
Freemont, California. 23
General Motors also has responded to this newly competitive environment by build-
ing seventeen new factories in Mexican towns just across the U.S. border. 26 It is there,
in locations easily accessible to U.S. markets, that much of General Motors' labor intensive
operations, such as cutting and sewing car' seats, take place. 27 General Motors pays
workers in the Mexican plants approximately $22 a week, and they maintain, by Mexican
standards, a middle-class existence. 28
All these developments have Itad dramatic impacts, of course, on the American
public and on General Motors' relationship with its employees. The auto industry's
voluntary" import quotas obviously have hurt consumers to the extent that such pro-
tectionism has limited the supply of foreign cars and boosted prices. 29 Indeed, estimates
reveal that higher prices for goods caused by all U.S. restrictions on imports, tariffs, and
other protectionist measures represent a hidden annual tax on American consumers of
over $58 billion, or over $255 per year per American consumer. 3°
On the other hand, the "voluntary" auto import quotas also have had the salutary
effect of protecting, albeit at a costs' the jobs of numerous General Motors and other
autoworkers. Nevertheless, large numbers of autoworkers have still lost their jobs or
taken pay cuts." Moreover, with American autoworkers continuing to earn an average
salary of $36,418 per year, or about $16.50 per hour,33 it is understandable why General
Motors has set up various operations in Mexico, and why the Japanese, who pay their
autoworkers about $10.00 per hour, 34
 have been able to successfully penetrate the United
States market.
One particularly beneficial aspect of increased foreign competition, however, is that
it has prompted the forging of new cooperative relationships between American labor
and management." This is especially true in the auto industry, where the recent GM-
UAW Saturn labor agreement is a pathbreaking paradigm.
II. THE GENERAL MOTORS-UNITED AUTOWORKERS SATURN LABOR AGREEMENT
In July of 1985, General Motors and the United Autoworkers Union entered into
a landmark labor agreement involving General Motors' new soon-to-be-opened Spring
24 See H.R. 1234, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. H290 (Feb. 2, 1983).
2' See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 119-21.
26 See O'Reilly, Business Makes A Run For The Border, FORTUNE, Aug. 18, 1986, at 72.
27 Id,
25 Id.
29 See generally A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 20, at 156.
"See M. WEIDENBAUM, supra note 10, at 285.
3L
 One observer has estimated that the restraints cost American consumers $160,000 per au-
toworker's job saved. See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 117.
32 See generally M. WEIDENBAUM, supra note 10, at 341 (outlining the massive layoffs at Chrysler).
33 See Shilling, supra note 14, at 24, col. 3.
34 See id.
35 See generally supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Hill, Tennessee, Saturn subsidiary." Under this labor agreement, workers will receive
eighty percent of the base pay that other unionized GM autoworkers receive, but also
will have the opportunity to increase substantially their base wages depending on pro-
ductivity." Moreover, in contrast to typical UAW organized plants which often have over
135 different job classifications," Saturn will have only one job classification for non-
skilled workers and three to five additional job classifications for skilled workers." The
agreement also contains various provisions for union/employee-management consensus
decision-making"' and explicitly seeks "a cooperative problem-solving relationship be-
tween management and the Union." 41
One of the most controversial sections of the Saturn agreement is section two, which
gives existing GM-UAW workers hiring preferences at the Saturn operation and rec-
ognizes the UAW as the bargaining agent for Saturn employees. 42 On August 6, 1985,
the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation filed unfair labor practice charges
against the UAW with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charging that this
section of the Saturn agreement, in particular, violates the right of employees under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to choose freely their own representatives."
On June 2, 198(3, however, the NLRB's Division of Advice released a lengthy
memorandum setting forth the legal bases for a decision by the NLRB'S General Counsel
dismissing the charge:14 The Advice Division memorandum in essence held that the
Saturn labor agreement was simply an extension of existing GM-UAW agreements and
thus was not unlawful. 5
The National Right to Work Foundation responded quickly to the NLRB's actions,
calling for General Counsel Rosemary Collyer's resignation in a June 4, 1986 letter to
President Reagan." Additionally, the Foundation proposed legislation to make the NLRB
General Counsel's prosecutorial discretion to dismiss or issue a complaint in response to
a party's unfair labor practice charge partially reviewable on appeal by the full NLRB. 47
The Right to Work Foundation also attacked Collyer's decision on legal grounds, spe-
cifically citing NLRA section 8(a)(2)'s 15 prohibition against undue employer support for
or collaboration with a labor organization and the impact of such undue collaboration/
support on individual employee rights."
36 The text of the agreement is reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 107, at E-1 (June 4,
1986) [hereinafter Saturn Contract].
37 See id. at E-3-4 (contract section 22).
33 See Reynolds, supra note 13, at 114.
39 See Saturn Contract, supra note 36, at E—'3 (contract section 19).
4" Id. at E-1-2 (contract section 10).
Id. at E-1 (contract section 1).
42 Id. (contract section 2).
" See Unfair Labor Practice Charge Against UAW brought by Rex H. Reed, August 6, 1985.
44 See DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 110, at E-1 ( June 9, 1986).
" Id. at E-3. The Division of Advice memorandum relied upon the decision of the NLRB in
Kroger Co., 219 NLRB 388, 389, 90 L.R.R.M. 1192, 1192 (1975) (upholding union recognition
based on a contractual "recognition clause" where new units became subject to the contract).
48 See DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 108, at E-1 (June 5, 1986).
47 The proposed legislation would afford an appeal only when the General Counsel decided to
dismiss a charge. See id. at E-2. See generally Rosenblum, A New Look at the General Counsel's
Unreviewable Discretion Not To Issue a Complaint under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349 (1977).
29 U.S.C.	 158(a)(2) (1982).
49 See DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 108, at E-2.
32
	
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:25
Interestingly, dissident rank-and-file UAW members at a June 6, 1986 gathering of
the UAW constitutional convention echoed similar themes. These members objected that
the Saturn agreement had been negotiated in advance without a chance for rank-and-
file approval, and received a pledge from UAW President Owen Bieber that the union
would not accept a Saturn-type agreement "in any other situation." 5° Various convention
delegates attacked the Saturn agreement as "company unionism"5 ' and suggested that
talk of union/management cooperation was phony. As one UAW delegate put it, "[w]e
are supposed to go hand-in-hand down the yellow brick road with General Motors while
they are busy outsourcing work overseas." 52 UAW President Bieber, however, emphasized
the importance to the union of gaining a toe-hold at Saturn because the union could
potentially organize the non-union Nissan operation twenty-three miles down the Ten-
nessee road. 55
With various sides attacking Saturn-type labor/management cooperation as unlawful
"company unionism," it is worthwhile to examine briefly the specific mandates of section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 54 the provision which prohibits such conduct. In examining section
8(a)(2), a critical question emerges as to whether the mandates of section 8(a)(2) continue
to make sense in today's labor-management relations environment, or whether the time
is now ripe to consider possible statutory changes.
Ill. SEcTioN 8(a)(2)
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act states, in relevant part, that it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or 'contribute financial or other
support to it."55 The purpose of this section was, as Senator Robert Wagner (the author
of the original NLRA) enunciated, to outlaw company-dominated unions. 56
Throughout most of the history of the NLRA, the NLRB has applied the mandates
of section,S(a)(2) quite literally, by basically adopting a "per se" rule proscribing any
management support of a labor organization which goes beyond a bare minimal level.
Thus, the NLRB has found that employers have violated section 8(a)(2) for allowing
labor organizations to use the copy machines" or telephones, 59 or for providing a labor
organization with a place or refreshments for:its meetings.59
In recent years, however, various courts, in particular the federal courts of appeals, 69
have been looking at section 8(a)(2) from a new perspective. The thrust of this new view
" See DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 110, at A—It) ( June 9, 1986).
5 Id. at A-10-11.
52 Id. at A-11.
" Id. Union organization of the Nissan operation also would potentially work to General Motor's
advantage by leveling the costs of production Which General Motors and its competitors face. See
Reynolds, supra note 13, at 121, 124 & n.2.
M 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982).
55 Id.
56 See 79 CONC. REC. 2368, 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner). See generally R. GORMAN,
LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 197-200 (1976).
57 See Kaiser Foundation Hosps., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 322, 91 L.R.R.M. 1523 (1976).
"See Shell Oil Co. of California, 2 N.L.R.B. 835, 845-48, 1 L.R.R.M. 548, 555-57 (1937).
59 See Kunst d/bla Connor Foundry Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 146, 151-52, 30 L.R.R.M. 2767, 2768—
71 (1952).
See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 627-30, 87 L.R.R.M. 2503, 2504-07
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is to sanction what is seen as positive labor/management "cooperaticin"'even when such
"cooperation" might well otherwise be seen as constituting unlaWful employer "support"
under section 8(a)(2)."' Thus, the Ninth Circuit in the 1974 case or t ertiha & Knowl6
NLRB" noted that literally "almost any form of employer cooperatidia, 'however innoc-
uous, could be deemed 'support' or 'interference,'" but that such a view of section 8(a)(2)
was "myopic" and cut against broader objectives of the NLRA." Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit in a recent section 8(a)(2) case asserted that "the adversarial model of labor
relations is an anachronistn."64
Numerous commentators have hailed this new view of section 8(a)(2), 65 and'a highly
important Department of Labor report, known as the "SchlosSberg Report," discussed
at greater length below, re cently embraced this new view." Indeed, the Department Of
Labor is•currently engaged in a major effort to promote labor-management 'coopera-
tion,67 and the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation has charged that
NLRB General Counsel Rosemary Collyer, in denying issuance of an unfair labor practice
coinplaint against the GM-Saturn pact, acted in concert with the Labor Department."
Yet while the tide for a reformed view of section 8(a)(2) grows stronger, a note of
caution is worthwhile. Solicitor General Charles Fried recently correctly asserted that
today's interpretations of section 8(a)(2) will affect the development of American indus-
trial relations in future generations." Moreover, while the highly adversarial model of
United States' labor-management relations of past eras indeed may be anachronistic in
today's world economy, some degree of labor-management separation and institutional
autonomy may be useful for the effective conduct of collective bargaining." Further, if
changes to section 8(a)(2) are to be made, they probably should he made by Congress,
rather than by federal judges on an ad hoc basis. 7 ' The issue seems extremely ripe for
careful congressional consideration.
(9th Cir. 1974) (taking a liberal view of what constitutes permissible cooperation under section
8(a)(2)).
"' See generally R. GottmAN, supra note 511, at 201-03.
62 503 F.2d 625, 630, 87 L.R.R.M. 2503, 2506 (9th Cir. 1974).
" Id. .
64 NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 293, 111  L.R.R.M. 2673,
2677 (6th Cir. 1982).
65 See, e.g., Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 YALE L.J.
510 (1973); Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 83 Mien. L. REV. 1763 (1985).
66 See "Analysis of U.S. Labor Law and Future of Labor-Management Cooperation," DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 116 at D-1, D-8-9 ( June 17, 1986) [hereinafter Schlossberg Report].
62 See id. at D-2-3.
See National Right To Work Legal Defense Foundation Letter to President Reagan, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 108, at ( June 5, 1986). The National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation is concerned with promoting the rights of individual employees within the union-
management structure.
" See Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of
Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 D. CHI. L. Ray. 1012, 1026 (1984).
7° For an excellent discussion of' this point of view see Note, Collective Bargaining As An Industrial
System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8 (a) (2) Of The National Labor Relations Act, 96
HAM/. L. REV. 1662 (1983).
71 Cf. Bierman, judge Posner and the NLRB: Implications For Labor Law Reform, 69 MINN. L. REY.
881 (1985) (attacking one prominent federal judge for his cavalier interpretation of the NLRA and
urging that Congress make necessary reforms rather than federal courts on an ad hoc basis).
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IV. THE SCHLOSSBERG REPORT
In June of 1986 the Department of Labor issued a major report dealing with United
States labor laws and the future of American labor-management cooperation. 72 The
report's principal author was Stephen I. Schlossberg, the Labor Department's
controversial" Deputy Under Secretary for Labor-Management Relations. The thrust of
the report is that strong support for labor-management cooperation is necessary if the
United States is going to be able to compete effectively in the world marketplace. 74
To this end, the report engages in an extensive review of existing labor laws and
the extent to which they hinder labor-management cooperative efforts. In addition, it
analyzes existing and developing cooperative programs. The report voices direct support
for the GM-UAW Saturn project," and advocates a liberal view of the strictures of NLRA
section 8(a)(2) 76
One of the most striking aspects of the report is the stridency of its anti-management/
pro-union language. Thus, for example, the report states that various observers do not
view the struggle between American labor unions and management as a fair one." The
report then goes on to observe that:
[p]erceivecl abuses of power on the part of labor — crippling strikes, picket
line violence, corruption, secondary boycotts, discrimination, and jurisdic-
tional disputes — have, for the most part, been dealt with by Congress
through legislative changes. But the fact remains that, over time, many
employers and their agents have become adroit at manipulating the labor
laws to delay and obstruct unionization. 78
The report then continues to advocate a program of essentially pro-union labor law
reform."
Regardless of the substantive merits of these assertions, which are certainly open to
debate, 8° what is most remarkable is that they were made in a document issued by the
Reagan Administration. The Reagan Administration frequently has been accused of
12 See Schlossberg Report, supra note 66.
" Schlossberg was formerly General Counsel of the United Autoworkers Union. See Federal
Staff Directory 1041 (1986). His appointment and conduct in office have raised the ire of various
conservative groups. See, e.g., DAILY LAS. Rte. (BNA) No. 108 at E-1 ( June 5, 1986) (letter to
President Reagan from National Right To Work Foundation implicating Schlossberg in the denial
of worker rights).
" See Schlossberg Report, supra note 66, at D-2.
" Id. at D-5.
" See id. at D-6—D-9, See also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
" Schlossberg Report, supra note 66, at D-4.
" Id.
79 Id. at D-4-5. Congress rejected a recent attempt at such reform in 1978. See 124 Cong. Rec.
18398 ( June 22, 1978) (failure to invoke cloture). See generally Comment, Labor Law Reform: The
Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755
(1979).
80 There is a voluminous literature debating the pros and cons of pro-union labor law reform.
See, e.g., Bredhoff, Labor Law Reform: A Labor Perspective, 20 B.C.L. REV. 27 (1978); Nash, The Labor
Reform Act of 1977: A Detailed Analysis, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 59 (1978).
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being extraordinarily "anti-union,""' particularly since the Professional Air Traffic Con-
trollers Organization ("PATCO") strike of 1981. 82
The great significance of the Schlossberg Report is that it analyzes and makes
recommendations regarding a number of issues from a labor-management cooperation
perspective. For example, the report criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University," which held that the University's faculty members were managerial
employees not covered by the NLRA. 84 The report also lambasts a decision of the NLRB
which held that physicians and dentists who have a voice in the management of their
facility cannot belong to a union. 85 The report concludes that as a result of these
decisions, "those individuals best suited to helping labor-management cooperation along
are lost to the cause."88
The Schlossberg Report also attacks the Supreme Court's decisions in NLRB v. Borg
Warner" and Truitt Manufacturing v. NLRB," which deal with the scope of bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act and the duty of employers to disclose infor-
mation to unions. The report advocates broader duties of employer : information disclo-
sure and a broadened scope of collective bargaining." The report also discusses, in a
positive vein, the issue of having union representatives on company boards of directors.""
Thus, international competition, perhaps for the first time ever, meaningfully has
brought the issue of American labor-management cooperation to the fore of public
discussion." The 1986 Schlossberg/Department of Labor Report, with its extensive anal-
ysis and controversial conclusions regarding the need for increased labor-management
cooperation, represents a landmark study of an increasingly important subject.
V. FOREIGN COMPANIES AND AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
With increasing numbers of foreign companies, particularly Japanese businesses,
opening operations in the United States, in part in an effort to overcome protectionist
barriers,92 the question has arisen as to what extent these companies fall under the ambit
of American civil rights laws. More specifically, the question arises whether, and to what
extent, these foreign companies must comply with the ban against employment discrim-
ination which Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 imposes. 83 For example, can a
" The Reagan NLRB has come under particular criticism. See Bierman, supra note 71, at 906
& nn.136-39.
"See generally Meltzer & Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic
Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 731 (1983).
" 444 U.S. 672, 687-90 (1980).
84 See Schlossberg Report, supra note 66, at D-6.
89 See Schlossberg Report, supra note 66, at D-6 (criticism of the Board's decision in FIIP, Inc.,
274 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 118 L.R.R.M. 1525 (1985)).
88 Schlossberg Report, supra note 66, at D-6.
"7 356 U.S. 342, 42 L.R.R.M 2034 (1958).
8" 351 U.S. 149, 38 L.R.R.M 2092 (1955).
"9 See Schlossberg Report, supra note 66, at D-9•
"Id. at D-10-11.
" 1 See generally Conference Focuses On Competition As A Means To Make American Industry More
Competitive, DAti,v LAB, Rio. (BNA) No. 229, at A-10-13 (Feb. 12, 1986).
"' See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
"42 U.S.C. secs. 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
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Japanese company doing. business in the United : States give hiring preference to Japanese
nationals?•
The issue is one which in recent years has been the subject of considerable scholarly
debate.94
 There also.have been:a number of federal court cases dealing with the question
in various .factual contexts. These cases generally have involved prominent Japanese
cornpanies,such as Sumitomo, Canon,. and ltoh.
The, Unites States incorporated subsidiary of Canon Corporation, Canon, U.S.A.,
for example, has been involved in two reported 1981 federal cases dealing with this
subject, In the first of these cases, Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., 96
 a male employee of the
company brought a, suit alleging that the company had a , hiring, promotional, and
employment system whieh discriminated , against and limited the opportunities of em-
ployees that were of non-Japanese national origin.
In defense, the company raised, an argument which has been the basic defense
asserted by defendant companies involyed in litigation of this kind. The company argued
that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and: Navigation (or "FCN" treaty) between
Japan and the United States?7 in essence exempts the company from the application of
Title VII, of the Civil .: Rights Act. More specifically, the company asserted that Article
yiu (1) of the FCN treaty, which: permits companies, of one party to hire "accountants
and other technical experts, executiye personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists
of their choice.'" when doing business within the territory of the other party, supercedes
any obligations the company might have under Title VII."
The federal district court, however, rejected this argument. The court reasoned that
because Canon, U.S.A. was incorporated in the United States, it was not a "company of
Japan" for purposes of coverage by the treaty)" The court pointed out that by doing
business in, the United States as an, independently incorporated subsidiary, as opposed
to a mere branch operation .
 of an existing Japanese company, Canon, U.S.A. derived a
variety oelegal and other benefits. 1 0' Thus, the court held, "[I]f a corporation decides to
organize under American law in order. to, invoke these benefits, it-does not seem unfair
to require it to accept theburdens of American law.'u° 2
 The court stated that the company
might be able to justify employing Japanese nationals in positions where such employ-
ment is "reasonably necessary to the successful, operation of its business."'"
94
 See, e.g., Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese
Employers, 31 STAN, L. REV 947 (1979);. Sethi & Swanson, Are Foreign Multinationals Violating U.S.
Civil Rights Laws?, 4, EMPI,OyEE REL. L.J. 485.(1979); Note, The Rights Of A Foreign Corporation And
Its Subsidiary Under Title. VII of the Civil Rights Act of I964, and Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, 1,7; GEO. WASH. J. INT'L EcoN. 607 (1983) [hereinafter Go. WASH. Note]; Edwards,
International Law and Employment Discrimination, 8 OKLAHOMA CITY L. REV. 1 (1983).
95 See, e.g., Avigliano v. Sumitomo Sholi Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.y. 1979), aff'd, 638
F.2d 552 (20 Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 457 U.S. 176 (1982); Speiss v. C. ltoh & Co.
(America), 469 F.Supp.. I (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd 643 : F.2cl 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded
457 U.S. 028 (L982)., See (140,GEO. WASH. NOTE, supra note 94, at 607 n.l.
96 28. F.E.P. 1679 (1n1.D. Ilk 1981).
?? Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, April 2, 1953, United States-japan, 4
2063 ;
	No. 2863..
6'5 Id. at art. VIII, para. 1.
99 Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., 28 F.E.P. at 1680.
100 Id.
to , Id. at 1682..
162 Id.
10 Id, at. 1684.
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The second case involving Canon, U.S.A., Mattison v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc.,'" involved
facts very similar to the earlier case. In Mattison, a male manager alleged he was fired
because he was non-Japanese.w5 A federal district court, however, rejected the company's
defense that it was exempted from Title VII by the FCN treaty. The court ruled that a
company that decided to incorporate in the United States came under this country's
laws. 10"
A federal district court in Texas took an almost identical approach to the issue
during roughly the same time period in a case involving the American subsidiary of the
C. Itoh company. The 1979 case of Speiss v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc.'" involved a suit
by three white male middle-management employees of the company's Houston office.
These employees asserted that the company had violated Title VII by discriminating
against them in favor of employees of Japanese national origin. The company defended
by arguing that the japan—United States FCN treaty exempted it from Title VII. The
court, however, rejected this defense out of hand, ruling that because Itoh America was
incorporated in the United States, it must come under United States law. 1 °8
The company appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, where it received a much friendlier reception. In Speiss v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),
inc.," the Fifth Circuit held, first, that Itoh America, as an American incorporated
subsidiary of Itoh Japan, had standing to invoke the coverage of the japan—United States
FCN Treaty."° The court then went a step further by ruling that Article VIII (I) of the
FCN treaty did in large measure exempt the company from the mandates of Title VII." 1
Thus, the authority of the company under the treaty to "engage executive personnel"
of its "choice" superseded any possible obligations under Title VII to treat white male
middle managers in a non-discriminatory ►anner. 112
Before the United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to review the Fifth
Circuit's 1981 decision in the Itoh case, however, the Court handed down its famous
1982 opinion in the case of Sumitomo Shoji American, Inc. v. Avigliano." 5 The Sumitomo
Court overruled the Fifth Circuit's holding in Itoh.
The Sumitomo facts, however, were slightly different from those in the cases involving
Canon and Itoh. While these other cases involved white American males alleging national
origin discrimination, the Sumitomo case involved white American female employees al-
leging both sex discrimination and national citizenship/national origin discrimination.'"
More specifically, the female employees asserted that their employer had restricted them
to clerical jobs and reserved executive and sales jobs within the company for male
Japanese citizens- 115
4°4 28 F.E.P. 1685 (N.D. 111.1981).
105 Id. at 1685.
06 /d. at 1686.
107 469 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded
457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
Id. at 9.
'°9 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
"0 Id. at 358-59.
1 " Id. at 359.
112 Id. at 360-62.
11
 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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The basic construct of the Sumitomo case, however, was the same as that in the cases
involving Canon and Itoh. Sumitomo America, like the other companies, was incorpo-
rated in the United States. This turned out to be the critical factor in the Supreme
Court's analysis. For when Sumitomo asserted that it was essentially exempt from the
mandates of Title VII because of the Japan—United States FCN treaty, the Supreme
Court responded as had the federal district courts in the cases involving Itoh and Canon.
The Supreme Court emphasized that because Sumitomo America was incorporated in
New York, it was a company of the United States and not of Japan." 6 Consequently, the
company was not entitled to protection under the Japan—United States FCN treaty." 7
The Supreme Court clearly rejected the company's assertion that the FCN treaty was
meant to cover Japanese company subsidiaries regardless of where they were incorpo-
rated."tl In the Supreme Court's opinion, if a subsidiary of a Japanese company is
incorporated in the United States, it is an American company covered by American laws,
and not by the treaty.
Thus, under the Supreme Court's holding in Sumitomo, if a Japanese company
decides to do business in the United States by way of a subsidiary incorporated in the
United States, that subsidiary clearly will be subject to Title VII and other United States
civil rights laws.'" Thus, the Sumitomo Court overruled the Fifth Circuit's holding to the
contrary in Itoh.
In .Sumitomo, however, the Supreme Court left unanswered as many questions as it
resolved. For one, the high court expressly avoided the issue of whether discrimination
suits based on national citizenship, as opposed to national origin, are cognizable under
Tide VII.' 2° Even more significantly, the Court failed to address the issue of to what
extent, if at all, the Japan—United States FCN treaty would limit the applicability of Title
VII in cases where the company clearly had the right to invoke the treaty's protection.
Such an issue might arise, for example, if a Japanese company set up a branch office,
as opposed to an independently incorporated subsidiary, in Los Angeles. If this Los
Angeles branch office then decided to hire only Japanese citizens for its executive
positions, the question of whether the Japan—United States FCN treaty permits it to do
so would need to be determined. There is some language in the Supreme Court's
Sumitomo opinion which suggests that the Japan—United States FCN treaty should not be
interpreted so broadly and that the opinion simply means that Japanese companies in
this country should be treated on a "comparable basis" with United States companies."'
Nevertheless, the high court did not address directly and clearly did not resolve this
issue.
Thus, all that is certain in the wake of Sumitomo is that if a Japanese company or a
company of another country where a similar treaty relationship exists desires the pro-
tection and privileges of operating in the United States by way of a United States
incorporated subsidiary, then that subsidiary must bear the burdens imposed by the laws
of this country. Beyond that, the waters are still relatively murky and likely to be tested
increasingly in the years to come.
"6 1d. at 182.
1 7 1d, at 183.
"a Id. at 185.
" 9 Id. at 189.
12 " Id. at 180 n.4.
121 Id. at 186.
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CONCLUSION
The modern economy is aptly described as a world economy. Foreign competition
and interchange is beginning to have a profound impact on the nature and conduct of
American employment relations. This impact was evident to a perhaps unprecedented
degree during the 1985-1986 survey year.
During this past year, American unions and managements coupled continued calls
for protectionism with unprecedented cooperative efforts. A re-thinking of the adver-
sarial posture set forth in parts of the National Labor Relations Act, such as section
8(a)(2), also began, This re-thinking was markedly evident in the United States Depart-
ment of Labor's landmark June, 1986 "Schlossberg Report," which called for greater
labor-management cooperation as a way of dealing with increased foreign competition.
These, and related issues, such as the employment relations implications of foreign
(especially Japanese) companies doing business in the United States, have clearly moved
to the fore of public concern. Indeed, in future Survey years, they can be expected to
be of greater and greater importance, as international economic forces increasingly
impact on American employment relations.
